本文来自微信公众号： IPP评论 ，作者：梅里·马达沙希，原文标题：《梅里·马达沙希｜世界秩序的临界点：中等国家正重塑全球格局》
正文
World Order at the Breaking Point:Middle Powers Reshaping the Global Order
当全球领导人齐聚达沃斯时，曾经熟悉的“合作”与“改革”话语，逐渐让位于对碎片化与权力政治的更为冷静、严肃的审视。不同于以往强调全球化、气候共识与技术乐观主义的会议，今年的议程更多由地缘政治竞争、经济约束与社会极化所塑造。经济增长放缓、通胀持续以及财政压力压缩了各国的政策空间；与此同时，战略竞争日益主导贸易、投资与技术领域，并成为会议议程的核心内容。
As global leaders gathered in Davos,the familiar language of cooperation and reform gave way to a more sober reckoning with fragmentation and power politics.Unlike previous editions that emphasized globalization,climate consensus,and technological optimism,this year’s agenda was shaped by geopolitical rivalry,economic constraint,and social polarization.Slowing growth,persistent inflation,and fiscal pressures narrowed policy space,while strategic competition increasingly governing trade,investment,and technology were on the main menue.
与此同时，人工智能的快速进展也不再主要被描绘为推动共同繁荣的引擎，而是更多被视为带来冲击、加剧不平等并引发治理争议的来源。在这种高度不确定的氛围中，达沃斯已不再是一个用以重申全球共识的论坛，而更像是一只测量仪，反映出一个正在艰难应对不满情绪、复杂性与加速变迁的世界——在这样的世界中，清晰的判断力与果断的领导力不再是理想化的追求，而成为制度运行层面的必需条件。
At the same time,rapid advances in artificial intelligence were no longer framed primarily as engines of shared prosperity,but as sources of disruption,inequality,and contested governance.In this climate of uncertainty,Davos no longer functioned as a forum for reaffirming global consensus,but as a barometer of a world struggling to manage discontent,complexity,and accelerated change,where clear thinking and decisive leadership were less aspirational ideals than systemic necessities.
达沃斯的讨论进一步揭示，多边主义之所以陷入困境，并非因为其制度架构已经消失，而是由于缺乏能够激活并持续支撑这些制度的可信领导力。今年达沃斯会议上对领导力缺失与制度疲劳的突出关注，标志着一次更深层次的反思：全球挑战的复杂性正在不断上升，而既有治理体系应对这些挑战的能力却在持续下降。这正是第56届世界经济论坛——即2026年达沃斯年会——所呈现出的整体图景。该会议于1月19日至23日在瑞士举行。
The discussions in Davos revealed that multilateralism is faltering not because its institutional architecture has disappeared but rather for lack of credible leadership to animate and sustain it.The prominence of leadership and institutional fatigue at this year’s Davos thus signaled a deeper reckoning:the gap between the complexity of global challenges and the declining capacity of existing governance systems to address them.This was the story of the 56 World Economic Forum known as Davos 2026,which was held from 19-23 January in Switzerland.
在过去，达沃斯会议的性质既由其所讨论的议题决定，也由被邀请参与界定这些议题的人群所塑造。近几年反复出现、彼此之间在很大程度上相互补充的三大支柱，通常构成了达沃斯议程的基本框架：
In the past,the character of Davos meetings was shaped both by the issues they addressed and by those invited to define them.The usual three,largely complementary pillars periodically dealt with over the past few years comprised:
对全球化的信心。这种信心建立在一个假设之上：不断加深的经济相互依存将继续为稳定与增长提供支撑。尽管不平等与韧性问题会被阶段性提及，但全球化本身作为国际经济体系的组织原则，很少受到根本性质疑。
Confidence in globalization,Confidence in globalization was grounded in the assumption that deepening economic interdependence would continue to underpin stability and growth.While concerns about inequality and resilience were periodically acknowledged,globalization itself was rarely questioned as the organizing principle of the international economic system.
气候议程的同步。这反映出围绕多边气候治理逐步形成、但仍相对脆弱的共识。过去，达沃斯越来越多地扮演推进“净零承诺”、绿色金融与公私合作伙伴关系的平台，其前提是相信环境可持续性能够与经济增长相协调。气候行动常被呈现为并非零和取舍，而是一项能够围绕共同目标动员国家、市场与公民社会的统一议程。
Climate alignmentreflected a growing,if fragile,consensus around multilateral climate governance.Davos increasingly in the past functioned,as a platform for advancing net-zero commitments,green finance,and public-private partnerships,premised on the belief that environmental sustainability could be reconciled with economic growth.Climate action often was presented not as a zero-sum trade-off,but as a unifying agenda capable of mobilizing states,markets,and civil society around common goals.
技术驱动的进步。这一支柱往往以创新的乐观叙事呈现。数字化、人工智能与自动化被广泛描述为提升生产率、促进包容、解决问题的引擎。治理挑战并非不被承认，但常被视为次要问题，置于技术进步的变革潜力之后。
Technology-driven progressoften was articulated through an optimistic narrative of innovation.Digitalization,artificial intelligence,and automation were widely framed as engines of productivity,inclusion,and problem-solving.Governance challenges were acknowledged,but often treated as secondary to the transformative potential of technological advance.
这些议题原本都将在今年的会议上展开辩论。本届会议的与会阵容也达到创纪录规模：来自65个国家的国家元首或政府首脑到场，来自130多个国家的约3000名与会者齐聚其间，另有近850位来自全球领先企业的首席执行官与董事长出席。
These issues were to be debated in this year’s meeting,where a record level ofheads of state or governments(from 65 coutries),3,000 participants from over 130 countries andNearly 850 CEOs and chairpersons from leading global companies were in attendance.
贯穿始终，论坛呈现出一种由矛盾所界定的状态：乐观情绪被不确定性所调和，宏大的议题被更为强势的个人所遮蔽，而人工智能的迅猛势头也不断受到“能否真正交付、落地”的现实问题挑战。在这一切的核心，是特朗普的回归。他在周中抵达后，几乎同时主导了会议的议程安排与整体氛围——甚至在正式发言之前，几乎所有公开分论坛与私下会谈的注意力，便已被他的到来所吸引与聚拢。
Throughout,the Forum was defined by contradiction,optimism tempered by uncertainty,big themes overshadowed by bigger personalities and AI’s momentum challenged by question of delivery.At the center of all was the return of Donald Trump.His midweek arrival dominated both the schedule and the mood,pooling focus from nearly every panel and private session,even before he spoke.
在2026年世界经济论坛（达沃斯）上，特朗普公开抨击丹麦、法国总统马克龙以及加拿大总理卡尼，重提要推动美国掌控格陵兰的主张。图源：世界经济论坛
在一场带有强烈民族主义与经济色彩的讲话中，特朗普将美国描绘为全球经济实力的引擎，宣称在其领导下，美国实现了显著的经济增长与韧性，并将之与他所称的欧洲国家表现乏力形成对比。他公开批评欧洲和北约，称欧洲“并未走在正确的道路上”。其言论超出了常规外交层面的批评，在谈及格陵兰问题时，对部分传统伙伴采取了更具对抗性的语气。他表示，“美国希望获得对该岛的控制权，因为只有美国具备独特的能力来对其进行防卫”。
In a strong nationalist and economic message,he portrayed the United States as the engine of global economic strength,claiming significant U.S.growth and resilience under his leadership,contrasting it with what he described as weaker performance by European countries.He openly criticized Europe and NATO,suggesting Europe was“not heading in the right direction”.His remarks went beyond routine diplomatic criticism,adopting a more confrontational tone toward some traditional partners when he focused onGreenland.He said that“the U.S.wantsto gain control of the island,since the United States is uniquely capable of defending it”.
在强调美国工业生产能力与能源部门的重要性时，他再次表达了对部分可再生能源的怀疑态度，并尤其对风力发电提出了批评。
Emphasizing U.S.industrial production and the energy sector,he reiterated skepticism about certain renewable energy sources,and criticized wind power in particular.
这场讲话迅速成为论坛最受关注的时刻之一：一方面源于特朗普本人的高度曝光度，另一方面也因为他的政策立场——尤其是在格陵兰问题与跨大西洋关系上的表态——被普遍认为可能对长期盟友关系带来破坏性冲击。
The speech was one of the most closely watched moments of the Forum,both because of Trump’s high profile and because his policy positions,particularly on Greenland and transatlantic relations,were seen as potentially disruptive to longstanding alliances.
这场演讲之后，紧接着登台的是加拿大总理马克·卡尼，他的发言题为
《原则与务实：加拿大的道路》（“Principled and Pragmatic:Canada’s Path”）。卡尼发表演讲之际，加拿大与美国之间围绕贸易与主权问题的紧张关系正在加剧。在此前一年中，美国总统多次威胁对加拿大商品加征关税，并公开发表言论，称要将加拿大变成“第51个州”。
This speech followed immdiately by that of Mark Carney Pime Minister of Canada whose address was entitled;"Principled and Pragmatic:Canada's Path".Carney’s speech was delivered amid escalating tensions between Canada and the United States over trade and sovereignty.Throughout the prior year,the US President had repeatedly threatened to impose tariffs on Canadian goods and made comments about making Canada the "51st state.
在一番带有含蓄批判意味的表态中，卡尼对美国政策作出指向明确的回应。他呼吁采取行动，倡导全球中等强国之间加强合作，并指出，中等强国应当“停止自欺”，不再假定以规则为基础的国际秩序仍然存在，而应接受它们所处的是一个“强权即公理”的世界。他强调，由于美国政策持续出现不可预测的摇摆，依托“美国霸权”而形成的冷战后规则型世界秩序，已经经历的是“一次断裂，而非一次过渡”。卡尼呼吁中等强国联合起来，对抗来自大国的经济胁迫。他指出，这些大国“已经开始将经济一体化当作武器，把关税作为施压工具，把金融基础设施作为胁迫手段，并将供应链视为可以加以利用的脆弱点”。
In a veiled denunciation of United States policy Carney called to action and advocated greater cooperation between the world's middle powers,and argued that middle powers should“stop pretending”the international rules-based order still exists and accept that they live in a“might makes right”world.He underlined that as a result of ongoing erratic shifts in U.S.policies,the rules-based world order of the post–Cold War era,enabled by "American hegemony," had experienced "a rupture,not a transition,".He called on middle powers to unite against economic coercion from great powers,which "have begun using economic integration as weapons,tariffs as leverage,financial infrastructure as coercion,and supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited."
卡尼认为，如果中等强国能够在这一被感知到的地缘政治转向面前实现团结，那么它们将拥有巨大的获益空间。在这番对美国政策的有力修辞中，卡尼进一步解释了为何在现任美国政府主导下，继续对美采取安抚策略注定无法奏效——因为现状只会使中等强国处于缺乏足够谈判筹码的地位。他指出，中等强国可以通过在志同道合国家之间结成联盟、走出属于自己的道路来改变这一局面，并补充道：“如果我们不在谈判桌上，就会被摆上菜单。”卡尼在演讲结尾强调，加拿大有意在推动建立真正合作的努力中发挥引领作用。
Carney argued that if middle powers unit in the face of this perceived geopolitical shift,then they had much to gain In this rhetorical punch to America,he explained why continuing to appease the U.S.under present presidency would never work;where the status quo has left middle powers with insufficient leverage.He referred to how middle powers can change this by charting their own course in coalitions of like-minded states,and added:“if we're not at the table,we're on the menu." Carney ended his statement by empasising that Canada intends to lead the way in the effort to create a genuine cooperation.
卡尼的演讲构思极为出色。尽管这场演讲在论坛上获得了热烈反响，但据称却激怒了美国总统，并由此改变了美加关系的整体基调。随之出现的一系列显著动向包括：加拿大被撤回加入“和平委员会”的邀请——该委员会的设立此前正是在达沃斯由特朗普总统宣布；有关对加拿大商品大幅提高关税的信号不断释放，所提及的税率最高可达50%；以及随后采取的具有惩罚性质的航空相关措施，其中包括大量加拿大制造的飞机和直升机被迫停飞。
Carney’s speech was brilliantly conceived.Despite the resounding reception it received at the Forum,it reportedly angered the U.S.President and altered the tone of U.S.–Canada relations.Notable developments included the rescission of Canada’s invitation to the“Peace Board”,the establishment of which had been announced by President Trump at Davos,indications of significantly higher tariffs on Canadian goods,with figures as high as 50 per cent being mentioned,and subsequent punitive aviation-related measures,including the grounding of large numbers of Canadian-made aircraft and helicopters.
此外，近期有关美国方面与主张提升阿尔伯塔省自治权的团体进行接触的报道，也为加美关系引入了一个敏感的主权维度。
Recent reports of U.S.contacts with groups advocating enhanced autonomy for Alberta have also introduced a delicate sovereignty dimension into Canada-U.S.relations.
卡尼从达沃斯回国后不到一天，就在魁北克市发表演讲，阐述加拿大的方向。他说：“加拿大无法解决世界上所有的问题。但我们可以证明可能有另一种道路。历史的弧线并非注定要扭曲成威权主义和排外主义，它仍然可以倾向进步与正义。”图源：路透社
在当前地缘政治与环境不确定性并存的时期，大国在全球气候治理中的立场变化显得尤为重要。随着美国释放出在雄心勃勃的气候政策承诺上出现一定程度回撤的信号，中国则日益明确地表达了其有意在全球摆脱化石能源、转向可再生能源技术的进程中发挥领导作用，而这些技术中相当一部分已实现国内生产。在这一背景下，中国在国际气候议题讨论中的分量不容低估。中国拥有约14亿人口，2024年其温室气体排放量占全球总量的近三分之一，这使得中国的政策走向对全球减缓气候变化努力的成效具有决定性意义。
In the current period of geopolitical and environmental uncertainty,particular significance emerges from the evolving positions of major powers in global climate governance.As the United States signals a partial retreat from ambitious climate policy commitments,China has increasingly articulated its intention to assume a leading role in the global transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy technologies,many of which are domestically produced.Within this context,China’s weight in international climate deliberations cannot be understated.Home to approximately 1.4 billion people,the country accounted for nearly one-third of global greenhouse-gas emissions in 2024,making its policy trajectory decisive for the effectiveness of global mitigation efforts.
去年9月在联合国气候峰会上，中国领导人宣布中国计划在2030年前开始降低整体排放水平，这一表态被广泛解读为中国气候战略出现重要再校准的信号。
At the United Nations Climate Summit last September,President Xi Jinping announced plans for China to begin reducing overall emissions by 2030,a declaration widely interpreted as a signal of strategic recalibration.
与这一立场相呼应，中国国务院副总理何立峰在本届论坛的发言中，将中国描绘为在日益碎片化的国际格局中发挥稳定支柱作用、并坚定维护多边合作的国家。在谈及可再生能源时，他强调了风能、太阳能和电池技术所蕴含的经济潜力，突出强调了中国在全球可再生能源体系中的重要角色。他邀请来自世界各地的企业把握绿色低碳转型带来的机遇，与中国开展紧密合作；同时还指出，中国目前已成为全球最大的电池、太阳能电池板和电动汽车制造国。
Complementing this position,Vice Premier He Lifeng,in his address to the Forum,portrayed China as a pillar of stability and a firm defender of multilateral cooperation in an increasingly fragmented international landscape.In reference to renewable energy he touted the economic potential of wind,solar and battery power.He emphasised the role of China in the world renewable energy system and the most complete new-energy industrial chain.He invited entreprises from all over the world to embrace the opportunities from the green and low-carbon transition,and workclosely with China.He also mentioned that today China is the world’s top manufacturer of batteries,solar panels and electric cars.
上述表态以及其他相关发言，使中国在本届论坛上被置于填补能源转型领导力空缺的位置——这一空缺，正是由于美国及部分其他西方国家在相关议题上的缺席而显现出来的。
These and other remarks positioned China to fill the void in energy-transition leadership at the Forum left unattended by the United States and some other Western countries.
全球秩序：模块化的多极格局？
在达沃斯2026上，马克·卡尼明确表达了一个如今已被许多分析人士认可的判断：全球秩序正在经历一个具有转折意义的时刻。
At Davos 2026,Mark Carney articulated what many analysts now agree is a transformative moment in global order.
冷战后建立起来的“以规则为基础的国际秩序”，曾以美国领导力与多边机制为稳定锚点，如今已不再可靠。卡尼强调，中等强国——如加拿大、欧盟成员国及其他国家——应当基于共同利益与价值观组建联盟，而不是等待大国“施惠”。
The rules based international order built in the post Cold War era,where U.S.leadership and multilateral institutions anchored stability,is no longer reliable or sufficient.Mr Carney stressed that middle powers(e.g.,Canada,EU states,others)should form coalitions with shared interests and values rather than wait for great power benevolence.
这一表述并非只是修辞上的，还反映了各国对“权力”理解方式的更深层变化：从依赖超级大国的安全与制度庇护，转向追求战略自主，以及更具弹性的联盟组合方式。
This framing isn’t just rhetorical,it reflects a broader transformation in how states conceive of power:from reliance on superpower patronage to strategic autonomy and flexible coalitions.
由此衍生出的“模块化”（modularity）特征，也并非新秩序的偶然副产品，而是其内生属性。中等强国之所以在这一格局中展现出相对优势，正是在于它们能够在多重利益与议题之间灵活游走，避免被完全卷入零和式的阵营对立。
This modularity is a feature of the new order,not an accidental side effect.Middle powers excel in it because they can straddle interests and avoid zero sum bloc logic.
这一趋势正变得愈发清晰：全球秩序正在发生结构性转变，从以美国为中心的单极体系，转向更加分散化、模块化的多极格局。包括欧盟、印度、加拿大、韩国以及若干拉丁美洲关键国家在内的中等强国，正通过定向贸易协定、联盟构建与议题导向的外交，更主动地确保自身的行动空间与政策能动性。
As it has become evident,global order is undergoing a structural shift from U.S.-centric unipolarity toward distributed,modular multipolarity.Middle powers,including the EU,India,Canada,South Korea,and key Latin American states,are asserting agency through targeted trade deals,coalition-building,and issue-based diplomacy.
最新的一系列动向——包括欧盟与印度的自由贸易协定，加拿大、英国、德国、法国等国对中国展开的双边接触，以及长期停滞的南方共同市场—欧盟谈判的重启——都在实践层面展示了这一重新对齐的过程，并加速推动中等强国的战略多元化。
Latest developments,including the EU-India free trade agreement,Canada,Great Britain,Germany,France and others bilateral overtures to China,and reviving long-stalled Mercosur-EU talks,illustrate this realignment in practice,which accelerated strategic diversifications among middle powers.
英国首相斯塔默在对中国进行了为期四天的访问后于1月31日离开上海。他在访问期间多次表示，自己做出的重启英中交往的决定将为英国民众带来切实利益。图源：新华社
与此同时，大国日益不可预测的行为——例如美国重新对韩国出口产品加征关税——削弱了长期联盟关系的可预期性，并引发了首尔加速推动面向东盟和欧盟的贸易多元化布局。
Simultaneously,unpredictable actions by great powers e.g.renewed U.S.tariffs on South Korean exports has undermined predictability of long-standing alliances,and sparked Seoul’s push toward ASEAN and EU trade diversification have.
这些全球体系中的快速变化，正在加速国际秩序从以美国为中心的结构，转向一个多极化的格局。在这一格局中，中国持续推进“一带一路”倡议与广泛的经济外交，已吸纳140多个国家参与；印度在担任金砖国家主席国期间，正试图成为一个关键枢纽，在西方、东方与“全球南方”之间保持平衡；与此同时，欧盟、韩国以及东南亚国家等区域性力量也在不断扩大其独立角色，并有望证明：中等强国不再处于体系边缘，而是跨阵营合作的重要通道，并且能够在超级大国立场分化之际参与塑造规则。除此之外，近期英国与欧盟在加入防务基金问题上的关系缓和，也可被视为这一趋势的最新例证。
These quick shifts in the global system expedite moving from a U.S.centric order to a multipolar landscape where;China continues its Belt and Road Initiative and expansive economic diplomacy,enrolling over 140 countries;India now chairing BRICStries to become a central pivot,balancing ties with the West,East,and Global South,regional powers like the EU,South Korea,and Southeast Asian states are expanding their independent roles and on track to prove thatmiddle powers are no longer peripheral but,they are conduits of cooperation across blocs and can shape norms when superpowers diverge.To these we might add the latest developments about rapproachment between UK and EU on joining defence funds.
这些发展并非出于理想主义，而是对权力格局碎片化的一种功能性适应。它们所指向的，是从制度转向联盟的变化。由此可见，这一转型并非朝向新的普遍性框架，而是迈向由中等规模国家所支撑的、分层化、议题特定型的联盟结构。在这一体系的核心，“贸易即地缘政治”发挥着更为广泛的功能：即在一个权威由区域性与议题性集团共同分担的多极秩序中，构建战略自主性、降低供应链风险，并参与塑造规则与标准。
These developments are not idealistic;they represent a functional adaptation to a fragmented power landscape.They signal a move from institutions to coalitions.As a result,the shift is not toward new universal frameworks but toward layered,issue-specific coalitions anchored by mid-sized powers.At its center,trade as geopolitics serves a broader function:building autonomy,de-risking supply chains,and shaping standards within a multipolar order in which authority is shared across regional and thematic blocs.
让我们以欧盟与印度之间达成的新贸易协定作为一个关键支点，来具体说明上述发展。经过长达18年断断续续的谈判，印度与欧盟宣布达成一项规模庞大的自由贸易协定，该协定有望大幅削减几乎所有商品的关税。若该协议获得批准并付诸实施，将形成一个覆盖约20亿人口、占全球GDP四分之一的自由贸易区。双方的政策制定者与分析人士普遍将该协定视为一项重大胜利，欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩与印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪更将其称为“所有贸易协定之母”。
Let us examplify these developments by new trade pactsbetween Eu and India as a pivot point.After 18 years of on-and-off negotiations,India and the European Union announced a mammoth free trade agreement that could slash tariffs on almost all goods.If the deal is ratified and implemented,it will create a free trade zone covering some 2 billion people and one-quarter of global GDP.Policymakers and analysts on both sides hailed the pact as a major win,with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling it“the mother of all trade deals.”
1月27日，印度与欧盟领导人在印度首都新德里举行会晤。印度总理莫迪宣布，印度和欧盟达成自由贸易协定，并表示该协定覆盖全球国内生产总值（GDP）的25%和全球贸易额的三分之一。图源：法新社
其他类似安排还包括“气候俱乐部”，例如欧盟与伙伴国家围绕碳标准形成的合作机制；以及防务或技术领域的联盟，包括类似“四方机制（Quad）”那样、成员构成具有可调整性的框架。这类安排通常是围绕具体议题展开的，而非全面性的战略或跨边界协定。尽管如此，这些协议强调的是共同利益，而并不要求在所有议题上实现完全一致。在这一空间中，中等强国能够跨越不同阵营发挥“中介者”的作用，并有助于缓解大国之间的零和压力。
Others include climate clubs,such as EU carbon-standard groupings with partner countries,as well as defence or technology coalitions,including Quad-like frameworks with adaptable membership.These arrangements are typically issue-specific rather than comprehensive strategic or transboundary pacts.Nevertheless,such pacts emphasize shared interests without requiring full alignment on all issues.In this space,middle powers can act as brokers across blocs and help reduce zero-sum pressures between great powers.
这种动态同样反映出一种更广泛的务实主义取向：欧盟—印度伙伴关系具有“模块化”特征——在利益契合的领域（如贸易、技术与韧性）中合作紧密，同时在存在结构性分歧的领域（如地缘政治与安全优先事项）中保持审慎管理。
This dynamic also reflects a broader pragmatism:the EU–India partnership is“modular”,strong where interests align(trade,technology,resilience)and deliberate in managing structural differences(geopolitics and security priorities).
新德里与布鲁塞尔已就一项贸易协议达成一致，该协议将取消多达40亿欧元的欧盟对印出口关税，并可能使欧盟对印度的出口规模翻倍。
New Delhi and Brussels have agreed a trade deal that will eliminate up to€4bn of tariffs on EU exports and could double shipments from the bloc to India.
达沃斯年会释放的信号
世界经济论坛在未发布正式宣言或经谈判形成的联合公报的情况下闭幕，这与其作为“对话与汇聚平台”而非“决策机构”的长期定位一致。论坛的使命并非给出答案，而是创造条件，使高度极化的行为体能够开始共同面对我们这个时代最具决定性的问题。
The World Economic Forum concluded without a formal declaration or negotiated communiqué,consistent with its long-standing role as a convening platform rather than a decision-making body,it was not to provide the answers,but to create the conditions under which deeply polarized actors could begin to live the most consequential questions of our age.
尽管如此，论坛结束后所呈现的发展，对多边主义与全球秩序具有高度重要性。闭幕阶段所传递的信息强调对话、反思与持续参与，既凸显了论坛在当下世界中的现实意义，也暴露了其在碎片化全球背景下的局限性。未能形成集体声明，本身就反映了当前国际政治与外交环境的状态。尽管达沃斯仍能为政治、经济与社会领域的领导者提供一个关键的交流空间，但形成共同承诺与统一方向所必需的条件，依然难以具备。因此，论坛并非在共识中结束，而是在对不确定性的承认中落幕，并以前瞻性的姿态强调：在不断加深的地缘政治、经济与制度性分裂之中，持续对话本身仍具价值。
At the closing,messages emphasized dialogue,reflection,and continued engagement,underscoring both the Forum’s relevance and its limitations in a fragmented global context.The absence of a collective statement is itself indicative of the current international political and diplomatic climate.while Davos could probvide a critical space for exchange among political,economic,and social leaders,the conditions necessary for shared commitments and unified direction remain elusive.The Forum thus ended not with consensus,but with an acknowledgement of uncertainty,and a forward-looking emphasis on sustaining conversation amid deepening geopolitical,economic,and institutional divides.
对论坛讨论及其结果的简要回顾，足以支撑上述判断：
A brief analysis of the debates and their outcomes nevertheless could justify these conclusions:
全球化不再被默认视为稳定器；它日益被置于“脆弱性、依赖性与战略风险”的视角下加以理解。
Globalization is no longer assumed to be stabilizing;it is increasingly viewed through the lens of vulnerability,dependency,and strategic risk.
气候议程的对齐不再被视为共同的远景，而是逐步成为与安全、增长与政治稳定相竞争、相冲突的优先事项。
Climate alignment is no longer treated as a shared horizon,but as a contested priority competing with security,growth,and political stability.
技术不再主要被框定为集体机遇，而更被视为一种需要加以“约束、监管与地缘政治定位”的扰动性力量。
Technology is no longer framed primarily as a collective opportunity,but as a disruptive force requiring containment,regulation,and geopolitical positioning.
我们将走向何处？
总体而言，冷战后以美国为锚点的国际体系，正在让位于一种更加分散、也更具模块化特征的全球架构。
As is,the post-Cold War,U.S.-anchored international system is giving way to a new,more diffuse and modular global architecture.
在当今这个快速变化且高度不可预测的世界里，我并不认为旧秩序会被一种“干净利落”的新秩序所取代。正如马克·卡尼所言：“我们必须主动面对现实世界，而不是等待那个我们希望存在的世界。”
In today’s ever-changing and unpredictable world,I do not see a clean replacement of the old order.As Mark Carney puts it,“We actively take on the world as it is,not wait around for the world we wish to be.”
那么，我们是否应当接受这样一种现实：与那些曾被我们视为生存所必需的原则与纪律发生“断裂”？是否应当承认，一个真正全新的结构性秩序，不可能在一年之内、甚至数年之内完全成型？抑或，我们应当将当下理解为进入了一个“分布式合作”的阶段，其特征是多极化、战略务实主义，以及围绕具体议题形成的联盟组合？
Should we then accept the reality of a“rupture”with all the principles and disciplines we once considered vital to our existence?Should we accept that a genuinely new structural order will not be fully in place within a single year,or even a few?Or should we instead understand the present moment as the entry into a phase of distributed cooperation marked by multipolarity,strategic pragmatism,and issue-specific coalitions?
越来越多的证据指向后者。我们正在目睹一种分层式的架构逐步成形，其中区域治理机制——如欧盟、东盟、非洲联盟——不断强化。诸如欧盟—印度自由贸易安排、印太地区的多边接触、中东经济走廊以及区域性标准框架的形成速度，已明显快于五年前。围绕具体议题构建的网络——气候俱乐部、数字贸易标准、技术规范——正日益超越普遍性制度结构；而在大国之间难以形成共识的领域，具有灵活性的“小多边”联盟正在协调应对。围绕人工智能治理、能源安全与数字标准的中等强国集团不断扩展，加之对危机、战争、供应链冲击与气候紧急状况的即时反应，正在以一种快于审慎制度设计的速度，迫使国际关系发生重新对齐。
The evidence increasingly points to the latter.We are now witnessing a layered architecture in which regional governance,the EU,ASEAN,the African Union,grows stronger.Free-trade agreements such as EU–India arrangements,Indo-Pacific engagements,Middle East corridors,and regional standards frameworks are forming far more rapidly than five years ago.Issue-specific networks,climate clubs,digital trade standards,and technology norms,increasingly eclipse universal structures,while flexible minilateral coalitions coordinate responses where consensus among great powers is missing.The expansion of middle-power groupings around AI governance,energy security,and digital standards,together with responses to crises,wars,supply shocks,and climate emergencies,forces realignments at a pace faster than deliberate designs.
这一转型的核心，是中等强国——那些不具备超级大国地位，但拥有外交灵活性、经济杠杆能力与规范塑造影响力的国家。正如马克·卡尼所强调的，它们的集体力量并不在于挑战霸权本身，而在于构建替代性的合作路径，这些路径以共同利益为基础，而非对大国的依附。
At the center of this transformation are middle powers,states that lack superpower status but possess the diplomatic agility,economic leverage,and normative influence to shape emerging frameworks.As Mark Carney emhasised their collective strength lies not in challenging hegemony,but in constructing alternative pathways for cooperation,grounded in shared interests rather than great-power dependencies.
这一新的秩序并非由正式的阵营或普遍性的制度所界定。相反，它采取的是模块化、可调整的框架——务实而具有战略性，其设计目的不是消除结构性差异，而是在承认差异的前提下实现长期共存与运作。
This new order is not defined by formal blocs or universal institutions.Instead,it adopts frameworks that are modular and adaptable,pragmatic,strategic,and built to endure structural differences rather than erase them.